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Calvo and Reinhart (2002) found a pervasive ‘fear of
floating’ in emerging economies, and that officially
announced currency regimes may diverge from central
bank practice. Calvo and Reinhart’s method is used to
show that currency market intervention appears to be
taking place in the kina, which is nominally a free floating
currency. Further, some of the contradictions in the
analysis are consistent with inflation targeting ‘lite’ (Stone
2003), and this framework may be useful in describing the
strategy being pursued by the central bank.
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Recent studies have questioned the
usefulness of categorising currency regimes
based on government policy statements, as
the behaviour of many currencies seems to
deviate from the stated position of the central
monetary authorities. During the 1990s,
currency regimes appeared to trend toward
the ‘hard corners’ of pegs and floats
advocated by economists in the belief that
intermediate regimes were incompatible with
the increased international capital mobility.
Fischer (2001) illustrated the trend using the
exchange rate regime declarations made to
the International Monetary Fund by central
banks: between 1991 and 1999 the number
of declared ‘floating’ regimes more than
doubled to make up 42 per cent of the 185
currencies monitored and to become the most
prevalent currency regime. Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) showed that, while many
countries claimed to have a floating currency,
there was evidence that central banks
continue to manage currencies to such an
extent that many could not be considered to
behave like floating currencies. Calvo and
Reinhart  describe this as a ‘fear of floating’,
caused by central bank concerns that a free
market for the currency might introduce
levels of exchange rate volatility that would
negatively impact on economic performance.
A floating regime can be defined as one
which is independent of exchange rate
targets, and which is not used as an
instrument for macroeconomic management.
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A floating exchange rate should be set by the
market, and in its purest sense there should
be no form of government or central bank
intervention. In reality, many central banks
of countries with freely floating currencies,
such as those of Australia and Japan,
intervene in the currency market, and Calvo
and Reinhart concede that a true float is ‘an
artifact of economics textbooks’ (Calvo and
Reinhart 2002:382). Perhaps in recognition
of this, Calvo and Reinhart chose the
Australian dollar as the benchmark for
floating currencies—a float in which the
central bank maintains some element of
control, but this control is exercised only in
situations of ‘excessive’ exchange rate
volatility and the effectiveness of this
intervention is debatable (Rogers and Siklos
2003). In the case of the ‘hard peg’ or the fixed
exchange rate, the currency is fixed to that of
another country or a ‘basket’ of currencies of
other countries.
However, the ‘mid-range’ of exchange
rate regimes incorporates a number of
options, and Calvo and Reinhart were
motivated to write their paper by a suspicion
that many countries were not completely
committed to a corner option. Hard pegs are
easy to monitor, and it is obvious when a
country has adopted one. But floating
currencies are more ambiguous and central
banks typically do not make their
interventions known. Calvo and Reinhart
developed a technique to see whether there
is central bank intervention in a supposedly
floating currency and found that emerging
market economies are particularly prone to
a ‘fear of floating’. As a result, studies relying
on government classifications to define
currency regimes may come to erroneous
conclusions.
The desire to manage a currency is often
predicated on an assumption that currency
volatility is bad for trade. Frankel and Wei
(1998), for example, observe that Europe
pursued exchange rate stabilisation in order
to promote bilateral trade. Fixed exchange
rates are thought to eliminate price
uncertainty, stimulating trade and
investment and lowering the real interest rate
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2003). It can
be argued that a more managed exchange
rate may benefit emerging market economies,
which are particularly reliant on foreign
investment for technological development
and growth (Meyer 2004; Liu 2002).
While the Bank of Papua New Guinea
states that the kina is a floating currency,
there is evidence that a soft peg is being
maintained. Following the float in 1994, the
peg appears to have been initially to the US
dollar (Bowman 2004) but it is likely that more
recently it has moved to a combination of the
Australian and US dollars (Appendix 1).
Inflation has been a significant problem in
the PNG economy, and some researchers (De
Brouwer 2000; Xu 1999) have called for more
formal dollarisation, or ‘aussification’, as a
way of reducing imported inflation, as is
implied by the Barro-Gordon framework
(Tavlas 2003). It is not clear, however, that a
fixed regime will create the much-desired
outcome of increased trade. Frankel and Wei
(1998) show that the prevalence of low levels
of trade in countries with volatile exchange
rate regimes seems to have been eliminated in
the 1990s with the advent of greater
international capital movement and more
financial instruments for hedging transaction
risks. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)
further find that emerging markets with less
flexible exchange rate regimes experience
slower rates of growth than those with floating
regimes. Trade and growth is a priority for the
Government of Papua New Guinea. Its interest
in increasing trade is spelled out in its ‘Export
Driven Growth Strategy’, currently being
implemented, which includes a range of
reforms aimed specifically at increasing
export revenues.
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Since the floating of the kina in October
1994, policy decisions have restricted the
market’s ability to set its value. In the past,
Papua New Guinea’s central bank has
exercised significant exchange conversion
controls that effectively prevented the value
of the kina being determined by market forces.
The International Monetary Fund (2003), in
Article IV consultations with Papua New
Guinea, observed that there was ‘frequent
intervention by the central bank’ during a
period of kina depreciation in 2002. The most
compelling evidence to support an exchange
rate management strategy comes from the
Bank of Papua New Guinea itself. Its website
clearly articulates a policy of exchange rate
stability, stating that ‘[m]aintaining price
stability in a small open economy like PNG
requires amongst other things, relative
stability in the exchange rate’.1 The bank sees
a stable kina is as particularly desirable, and
kina stability is a major discussion point in
the semi-annual Monetary Policy Statements.
For instance, the July 2005 statement
commented that an increase in reserves
means that in future ‘the Bank will have
greater flexibility in counteracting any
adverse movements in the exchange rate’
(Bank of Papua New Guinea 2005b:12).
Other research also illustrates that the
kina has not been allowed to float freely.
Bowman (2004) used a simple Frankel and
Wei (1994) style OLS regression of the kina
against other major currencies to find a
weighting of 0.93 assigned to the US dollar,
the type of result expected in a pegged regime.
These observations make it seem unlikely
that the kina is behaving like a freely floating
currency, but as Calvo and Reinhart did not
include the kina in their study, it is useful to
see if the kina conforms to their beliefs about
a ‘fear of floating’ in emerging market
currencies.
This study initially assesses the
behaviour of the kina using the Calvo and
Reinhart technique and contrasts its
behaviour with that of the Australian dollar.
It is found that there is evidence that the kina
has experienced some management, and that
this may be consistent with an inflation
targeting ‘lite’ regime, which may both
explain recent low inflation (Figure 1) and
the continued strong relationship of the US
dollar to the kina (Appendix 1). Inflation
targeting ‘lite’ may be a useful framework
for future analysis of PNG monetary policy,
but the economic climate in Papua New
Guinea is changing: fiscal stability and a
Table 1 Volatility of selected indicators, Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1995–2004
Export volatility Prob Prob
(avg qrtrly % change) (monthly % change (monthly % change > ± 4% )
within ± 2.5% band)
Interest rates
Exchange rate Reserves Nominal Real
Australia
January 1995–January 2004 5.67 66.67 45.37 - -
Papua New Guinea
January 1995–January 2004 11.27 55.56 25.00 4.63 6.48
Notes: Period runs from January 1995–January 2004 inclusive.
Source: Monthly data were obtained fromthe International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Quarterly export data obtained from the Bank of Papua New Guinea and the Australian Bureau of
Statistics. Value of exports denominated in current Australian dollars.
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booming commodity market have created a
promising basis for economic growth and
development. The outlook for Papua New
Guinea is the best it has been in years. The
recent dismantling of exchange controls and
a sustained low inflation environment has
created a climate receptive to less currency
management. Given that recent studies of the
relationship between trade and exchange
rates are less supportive of previous beliefs
that a stable exchange rate would lead to
increased trade, it is possible that the kina
will be allowed to float more freely in future.
Method and data
The study period used here for the Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) analysis runs from January
1995 to January 2004 (the months
immediately after the float of the kina have
been omitted to allow for a ‘settling in’
period). Both Papua New Guinea and
Australia had officially nominated floating
currency regimes throughout this period.
Monthly data is used (when quarterly data,
such as CPI data, is used, it is assumed to be
constant over the three months of the
associated quarter).
While official policy nominates the kina
as a float, it is likely that the effects of exchange
controls result in behaviour more akin to a
managed float or soft peg. The Calvo and
Reinhart methodology can be used to
examine the behaviour of the currency and
other macroeconomic indicators to see if
government policy reflects the actual
management of the currency. They propose
a model of exchange rate management based
on central bank credibility, pass-through
levels and inflation targeting. They suggest
that a lack of credibility is associated with
higher variance in risk premium shocks, and
that inflation targeting is manifest in interest
rates. To test this, exchange rate, interest rate
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Figure 1 Papua New Guinea headline inflation and real GDP growth (annual), 1993–2004
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea.
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and reserves variability are examined. As per
Calvo and Reinhart, the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS) data are used for each
series. Exchange rates are monthly end-of-
period bilateral exchange rates against the
US dollar (IFS line AE, used as monthly
percentage change), reserves are gross foreign
exchange reserves minus gold (IFS line 1L.D,
used as monthly percentage change),
nominal interest rates are obtained from IFS
line 60B (Interbank rates) and 60C (182 day
T-bill rates) for Australia and Papua New
Guinea respectively, and consumer prices
were obtained from IFS line 64 to deflate
nominal interest rates.
Results and discussion
The Calvo and Reinhart (2002) study used
the Australian dollar as the benchmark for
floating currencies, and it is used here for
contrast with the behaviour of the kina. Calvo
and Reinhart initially examined exchange
rate volatility for evidence of activity
designed to smooth or minimise currency
fluctuations. Exchange rate volatility is likely
to be lowest in countries with a highly
managed regime, such as a hard or soft peg,
while a floating regime is likely to be highly
volatile as market forces, not exchange rate
targets, set the value of the currency. Calvo
and Reinhart determine that a managed
currency has a greater probability of
remaining within a volatility band, set by the
authors at ±2.5 per cent, than a floating
currency. If the kina is being actively
managed, it is expected that the monthly
price movements are more likely to remain
within the ±2.5 per cent band than those of
the Australian dollar. Calvo and Reinhart
show that, the more managed the regime, the
higher the likelihood of fluctuations falling
within the ± 2.5 per cent band. Their managed
floating regime on average has exchange rate
changes falling within the band around 87.5
per cent of the time. They find that the
average for a floating exchange rate is around
77 per cent—higher than the Australian
benchmark probability of 70 per cent, and
higher than the Australian results found here
of 66.67 per cent. Over this time period, the
kina’s probability of variance within the band
is lower still (55.56 per cent), which indicates
a greater degree of volatility than that of the
managed and pegged regimes. Indeed,
during this period the kina is more volatile
than the Australian dollar. This evidence fits
with the official assertion that the kina is a
floating currency.
Calvo and Reinhart argue that further
indications of central bank intervention can
be taken from the levels of foreign exchange
reserves. The more heavily-managed
currencies are said to be accompanied by
greater fluctuations in the levels of reserves
as foreign exchange is bought or sold in
attempts to influence the exchange rate.
Calvo and Reinhart find that central banks
of more managed currencies are less likely to
keep fluctuations in their reserves of that
currency within a narrow ±2.5 per cent band.
Some fluctuation in reserves is to be expected:
for example, reserves may fluctuate if their
assets change in value or accrue interest.
Calvo and Reinhart note that changes in the
value of New Zealand’s reserves are a result
of foreign currency debt management rather
than exchange rate management. Previous
PNG governments have left significant debts
that are currently being rationalised, and
improved fiscal management has resulted in
a focus on debt reduction. It is likely that this
explains some of the reserve movements, but
it is also likely that some of the reserve
variance is caused by exchange rate
management.
The Australian benchmark for reserve
variance in the Calvo and Reinhart study is
50 per cent, with some floating currencies
experiencing much greater reserve stability
(such as Japan, at 74 per cent). The results
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found here for Australia indicate that
perhaps slightly more government
intervention has taken place during this
period, with reserve fluctuations falling
within the ±2.5 per cent band only 45.37 per
cent of the time. Papua New Guinea, with
reserves in the band only 25 per cent of the
time, is below that of Calvo and Reinhart’s
average floating result of 37.79 per cent. This
does not necessarily indicate market
intervention: as noted previously, it is
possible that these changes reflect the
management of foreign currency-
denominated debt. Further, Papua New
Guinea has more volatile export revenues
than Australia, with quarterly fluctuations
of 11.27 per cent compared with Australia’s
5.67 per cent. This could explain more volatile
reserves.
In their study, Calvo and Reinhart note
an interesting anomaly: the average of the
managed floating currencies (39.2 per cent)
is higher than that of the floating currencies
(37.8 per cent), implying that countries with
floating currencies have less stable reserves
than countries with managed currencies.
However, they also show that those countries
with the most stable exchange tend to have
the most volatile reserve holdings. Since the
kina has a more volatile exchange rate,
coupled with more volatile reserves, firm
conclusions cannot be drawn at this point.
According to Calvo and Reinhart,
evidence of monetary policy interactions can
also be found in the movement of nominal
interest rates. If interest rates are being
managed to stabilise the exchange rate, it is
likely that they will be more volatile than
those not being used to manage exchange
rates. The available rate most closely
influenced by monetary policy is selected for
examination:  in the case of Australia, this is
the interbank rate, while in the absence of
this rate in Papua New Guinea the PNG 182-
day T-bill rate is used instead. Calvo and
Reinhart find that, while interest rates are
most stable for limited flexibility regimes, this
is not always the case in emerging markets.
A lack of central bank credibility will result
in volatile interest rates when expectations
about inflation targets and exchange rate
volatility incite negative investor sentiment.
Evidence from Calvo and Reinhart (2001)
indicates that interest rate variance is highest
for emerging market countries with managed
exchange rate regimes. If the kina is a soft
peg or a managed float, higher interest rate
variance can be expected, while interest rate
variance should be low in Australia as the
central bank is credible and investors are
unlikely to receive any nasty surprises. For
interest rate variance, a band of ± 4 per cent
is used, and Calvo and Reinhart find that
floating regimes typically have a low level of
interest rate variance. Notable outliers
(Mexico, Peru) generate an average result of
8.5 per cent, which is higher than the median
of 2.8 per cent, and in general it can be said
that interest rate volatility is very low for
floating regimes. Consistent with this story
is the result for Australia—interest rate
movements outside the band are non-existent
(0 per cent).
The results for Papua New Guinea show
a greater level of interest rate variance (4.6
per cent), higher than the median of the
floating regimes. This is, however, consistent
with Papua New Guinea’s status as a less
developed country, as these countries are
more likely to have higher interest rate
variance. Real interest rates tell a similar
story, with some movement outside the band
(6.5 per cent) in the case of Papua New
Guinea, while again the Australian real
interest rate did not move outside the ± 4 per
cent band during the study period. Calvo and
Reinhart observe that the managed floating
regimes have the most volatile exchange
rates—and that this category also contains
more emerging market countries than other
categories. If the Bank of Papua New Guinea
is in fact trying to stabilise the exchange rate
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through domestic open market operations
and is afflicted by a lack of credibility
(consistent with Calvo and Reinhart’s and
King and Sugden’s (1997) explanations of
interest rate volatility), then these results
support the premise that the kina is behaving
like an emerging-market managed regime.
In general, therefore, the evidence
presented for Papua New Guinea is mixed.
High levels of exchange rate volatility imply
little government exchange rate intervention,
but volatile reserve levels may indicate the
opposite. Reserve levels may fluctuate for
other reasons, however, so no firm
conclusion can be drawn, despite reserve
volatility being significantly greater than
Calvo and Reinhart’s floating average and
the Australian situation. Nonetheless, like
emerging-market managed floating
currencies, both nominal and real interest
rates are highly volatile.
An alternative to exchange management
is inflation targeting, and it has been
suggested that the Bank of Papua New
Guinea is pursuing an inflation target,
resulting in the current low inflation period.
Calvo and Reinhart show that a lack of
central bank inflation targeting credibility
can lead to both increased interest rate
variance and increased foreign exchange
volatility in emerging markets, precisely the
results observed here. They show that the
variance in the exchange rate can be
described as
22
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where ss is the variance of a random shock
describing the risk premium, b represents the
credibility of the inflation target, and k is a
constant money multiplier. Under their
assertion that the effects of risk premium
shocks on the currency can be offset
completely by setting nominal interest rates,
the variance of the exchange rate is
independent of the risk premium and is
instead governed by the credibility of the
inflation rate target. As credibility increases,
or b®¥, s2E ®0 so expected exchange rate
volatility falls.
The lack of a credible inflation-targeting
regime may explain the paradox of volatile
reserves coupled with a volatile kina. Any
inflation targeting being performed by the
Bank of Papua New Guinea can only be
described as ‘inflation targeting lite’ (Stone
2003). Under this definition of inflation
targeting, the central bank does not commit
transparently to an inflation target, but
instead reserves the right to adjust it as
required. Inflation targeting ‘lite’ regimes
have multiple monetary policy objectives,
and intervene in the exchange rate. These
regimes also emphasise financial stability
and often involve a commitment to price
stability as the primary objective of monetary
policy. This definition appears to fit the
different phenomena observed and the
Bank’s public statements. If the Bank of
Papua New Guinea is pursuing inflation
targeting ‘lite’, it is in good company, as
research indicates that this regime is
prevalent among emerging markets with less-
managed currency regimes. As Stone
observes, countries pursuing the inflation
targeting ‘lite’ management strategy
typically have higher levels of government
debt, are more exposed to economic shocks,
and are less integrated into global capital
markets. Stone also observes that inflation
targeting ‘lite’ countries are more active in
foreign exchange management.
So is the Bank of Papua New Guinea
pursuing inflation targeting ‘lite’? Certainly,
if it is pursuing an inflation target, the lack
of a clearly articulated policy including
distinct and publicly disseminated targets
means that only this option is possible.
Further, recent Bank of Papua New Guinea
statements provide evidence that it may be
inflation targeting. Price stability has come
to the fore in its Monetary Policy Statements,
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with the Bank stating that its main objective
is ‘achieving and maintaining price
stability’. In addition, it states that
[s]tability in price is therefore taken to
mean stability in inflation, which can
be defined as low inflation attained
over a reasonable period of
time…[p]rice stability requires steady
movements in the exchange rate and
other price variables (Bank of Papua
New Guinea 2005a:12).
This statement neatly summarises the
ingredients of an inflation targeting ‘lite’
regime, and goes a considerable way
towards explaining the kina’s fear of floating.
Conclusion
Like many emerging-market ‘floating’
currencies, it appears that the PNG kina does
not behave exactly as described by official
policy. The kina may be afflicted by the ‘fear
of floating’ identified among many
emerging-market currencies by Calvo and
Reinhart. This will not be a surprise to those
engaged in research on the kina, as exchange
controls have always meant that the kina’s
exchange rate value could not be purely
market-determined. The evidence here
suggests that the Bank of Papua New Guinea
may be following an inflation targeting ‘lite’
regime and is perhaps afflicted by a lack of
credibility, which would explain much of the
observed behaviour of reserves, interest rates
and exchange rates.
It seems clear that currency management
is taking place, and public statements by the
Bank of Papua New Guinea indicate that this
policy is unlikely to change in the near future.
Prior research shows that currency targets
are based on the US dollar and the
Australian dollar (Bowman 2004). This
makes sense: Australia continues to be a
major trading partner for Papua New
Guinea, and, as a major mineral exporter,
much of Papua New Guinea’s exports and
imports are likely to be denominated in US
dollars. As the Bank of Papua New Guinea
moves to lift currency conversion controls, it
is possible that the kina’s characteristics will
resemble more closely those of a floating
currency.
Notes
1 Available online from http://
www.bankpng.gov.pg/monetary-policy/
index.htm (accessed 1 September 2005).
2 Currency data obtained from Datastream;
currencies are denominated in Swiss francs.
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Appendix 1
Currency relationships
If the kina is being managed, how is this
taking place? The most likely possibility is
that the kina is being ‘soft pegged’ to a foreign
currency, and some believe that this is the
Australian dollar. The recent economic
assessment from the Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade states that the
kina ‘tracks closely’ the Australian dollar
(Australia 2004:27). Previous research
(Bowman 2004) demonstrated that the kina
was strongly tied to the US dollar between
1993 and 2003 and found no evidence of a
relationship with the Australian dollar.
However, this period commenced prior to the
floating of the kina, and the situation may
have changed more recently. From a visual
inspection of nominal price movements in
the kina and the Australian dollar
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(Appendix Figure 1) it appears that a ‘parting
of ways’ took place in 1998, and that the kina
has devalued significantly against both the
US dollar and the Australian dollar. A more
robust analysis of the more recent period of
currency management is useful to assess the
impact of currency management in the light
of the ‘fear of floating’ findings.
A brief assessment of monthly currency
data for the period January 2000–04 2
demonstrates that the relationship between
the Australian dollar and the kina has
strengthened over the last five years.
Correlation statistics (Appendix Table 1)
show that the kina is highly correlated with
both the Australian dollar and the US dollar
(as the kina is a much less traded currency
than either dollar, assumptions about the
direction of causality can be made
confidently). The US dollar is more strongly
correlated with the kina, at 0.78, while the
Australian dollar is somewhat less correlated
at 0.29. This supports the findings of
Bowman (2004) that the US dollar is the
currency with the strongest relationship to
the kina, although, unlike Bowman’s earlier
findings, it is likely that the Australian dollar
is now playing a more significant role in
determining the final value of the kina. The
kina is also significantly cointegrated with
both currencies at 1 per cent, incorporating
two lags for the Australian dollar and four
for the US dollar. This finding has much
intuitive resonance, and indicates significant
long-run relationships with both currencies
(although cointegration statistics do not give
an indication of the relative importance of
either currency to the value of the kina).
Additionally, Frankel and Wei (1994)
style regression tests (Appendix Table 2)
indicate that the Australian dollar now has
a weighting in the kina’s currency basket,
although it should be noted that the R 2
measure of fit is not strong (0.27). The
findings of the Frankel and Wei regression
over this recent time period support the
results of the correlation tests, with the
weighting of the US dollar in the kina’s
currency basket (b1, 0.57) larger than that of
the Australian dollar (b2, 0.29). Again this
test demonstrates that the Australian dollar
is now influencing the kina, but the kina’s
movements are still dominated by the US
dollar.
It is likely that the composition of any
basket peg changes over time in response to
changing monetary policy. When a range of
periods is examined, the Frankel and Wei
regression is found to strengthen
considerably during some periods. It
appears, for example, that there was a period
of much tighter currency management
between June 2001 and January 2004
(Appendix Table 3). The regression R 2
measure of fit was strong (0.52), a result more
often seen in basket-pegged regimes. During
this time, the US dollar was dominant (0.82)
and these results certainly indicate that the
Bank of Papua New Guinea is not pursuing
a ‘hands-off’ management strategy.
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Appendix Table 3 Other horizons regression statistics
a b1 US$ b2 A$ R
2 DW
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
June 2001–January 2004
PNG kina –0.0025 0.8184 0.2490 0.52 1.90
(–0.42) (3.39) (1.30)
Notes: Statistics for monthly nominal currency series, all currencies denominated in Swiss franc. Calcula-
tions made in logged differences as per Frankel and Wei (1994), with the model taking the form
Dlog(PNG
t
) = a + b
1
Dlog(USD
t
)+ b
2
Dlog(AUD
t
) + e
t
This period significantly reinforces evidence that the kina may be a pegged regime. The R2 line of fit is
strong, and indicates significant management during this time. Again the US dollar is the dominant
currency, and its dominance appears to have increased during this period. Again the estimated coefficient
for the Australian dollar is not statistically significant. Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that the analysis is
robust to autocorrelation.
Appendix Table 2 Regression statistics
a b1 US$ b2 A$ R
2 DW
(t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
PNG kina, Jan 2000–Jan 2004 –0.0027 0.6758 0.2357 0.24 1.98
(–0.39) (2.69) (1.06)
Notes: Statistics for monthly nominal currency series, all currencies denominated in Swiss franc. Calcula-
tions made in logged differences as per Frankel and Wei (1994), with the model taking the form
Dlog(PNG
t
) = a + b
1
Dlog(USD
t
)+ b
2
Dlog(AUD
t
) + e
t
It is clear that the US dollar retains a dominant role in the currency basket, reinforcing the findings of
correlation analysis.The coefficient estimated for the Australian dollar is not statistically significant. The R2
line of fit is not as strong as is often the case in currencies declaring a pegged exchange rate. While manage-
ment may be taking place, it is likely to be less than that which occurs in a formally pegged regime, result-
ing in a weaker line of fit. Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that the analysis is robust to autocorrelation.
Appendix Table 1 Cointegration and correlation statistics
PNG kina
Correlation Cointegration
January 2000–January 2004
A$ 0.2927 32.03**b
US$ 0.7795 21.02**a
Notes: a Intercept (no trend), 4 lags b Intercept and trend, 2 lags ** Significant to 1 per cent. Statistics for
monthly nominal currency series, all currencies denominated in Swiss francs.
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Appendix Figure 1 Australian dollar and PNG kina nominal price movements
1995–2004 ($US)
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2005. International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund,
Washington, DC.
